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10.1 Introduction
Underlying weaknesses in the domestic ﬁnancial sector and limited integra-
tion with world ﬁnancial markets make emerging market economies vulner-
able to “sudden stops” of capital inﬂows. Without much warning, the capi-
tal ﬂows that support a boom may come to a halt, exposing the country
to an external crisis.
Monetary policy in this context has often been seen as an additional
source of problems rather than as a remedy. Countries with a history of in-
ﬂation problems have limited central-bank credibility. The currency pres-
sures of the sudden stop test this credibility, so that either the loss of cred-
ibility or the attempt to regain it in the middle of the crisis exacerbates the
contraction.
However, there is a group of countries for which the problem of high and
unstable inﬂation is no longer present but the problem of sudden stops
persists. These countries include Chile, Mexico, and many of the Asian
economies. Moreover, looking toward the future, this group is bound to
grow, as hopefully Brazil, Turkey, and countries of Eastern Europe estab-
lish discipline over seigniorage and ﬁscal policies.
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targeting” in a wide range of economies, it seems only natural that this
framework be contemplated for these economies as well. In this paper, we
study how inﬂation targeting should be adapted to countries whose primary
macroeconomic concern is the presence of sudden stops in capital inﬂows.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation from Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2002) that, during a sudden stop, monetary policy loses
its potency. The principal constraint on output is a shortage of external re-
sources. The main eﬀect of domestic money, on the other hand, is on
agents’ domestic borrowing capacity. Thus, the knee-jerk reaction of the
central bank to the outﬂow of capital, of raising domestic interest rates—
dubbed “fear of ﬂoating” by Calvo and Reinhart (2002)—within our
model is the natural consequence of a central bank that is concerned with
inﬂation and output. Raising interest rates reduces the exchange rate de-
preciation, with limited eﬀects on output beyond the impact of the exter-
nal constraint. However, while fear of ﬂoating may seem optimal from this
contemporaneous perspective, it is suboptimal ex ante.
The reason for this suboptimality is that the anticipation of the central
bank’s tight monetary policy during the sudden stop has important eﬀects
on the private sector’s incentives to insure against sudden-stop events. In-
suring against these events means taking prior actions that increase the to-
tal dollar assets of the country (decrease the total dollar liabilities of the
country) in the sudden-stop event. Since a contractionary monetary policy
reduces the domestic scarcity value of dollars, it also lowers the returns to
hoarding net dollar assets. Simply put, contracting dollar debt is less costly
in an environment where the peso is expected to be supported in the event
of a crisis. Thus, the anticipation of a tight monetary policy leaves the
economy less insured against the sudden stop.
In this context, expectations shape policy, not in whether inﬂation is an-
ticipated or unanticipated, but in how the private sector views its rewards
to insuring against sudden stops. For incentive reasons, the optimal mon-
etary rule is to expand during external crises, even if the expansion has a
limited contemporaneous eﬀect on output.
It should be apparent that time inconsistency is a serious issue in this con-
text. A central bank that cannot commit will ignore the insurance aspect of
monetary policy and follow a procyclical, rather than the optimal counter-
cyclical, policy. This bias is made worse by the presence of an expansionary
bias a la Barro and Gordon (1983). The reason is that the central bank only
sees a beneﬁt from expanding during normal times. As a result, it lowers in-
terest rates during these times, leading to higher inﬂation (as in Barro and
Gordon). When the sudden stop occurs, the central bank has even more
reason to defend the exchange rate as it inherits high inﬂation.
In our framework, since crises are characterized by dollar shortages,
there is scope for managing international reserves in order to ease these
424 Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthyshortages. Our model provides a natural motivation for both centralized
holding of reserves and holding reserves in the form of dollars. However,
we show that a central bank that cannot commit will be too aggressive in
injecting dollar reserves during a crisis. Moreover, this distortion interacts
with the monetary policy problem. A more suboptimal monetary policy
will lead to a more severe crisis, and a greater incentive for the central bank
to inject reserves.
Given the time inconsistency of the central bank, what should its man-
date be? That is, how should the central bank’s objectives be modiﬁed so
that it internalizes the insurance dimension of the sudden-stop problem?
We propose modifying inﬂation targeting so that the central bank follows
state-contingent inﬂation targets, overweights nontradable inﬂation in the
measure of inﬂation that is targeted, and explicitly weighs reserves hold-
ings in its objectives.
Since the no-commitment central bank loosens during good times and
tightens during bad times, we suggest that its mandate should make the in-
ﬂation target countercyclical (i.e., low during good times and high during
sudden stops). In practice, the state contingency may be implemented by
making inﬂation targets contingent on external factors such as commodity
prices, U.S. interest rates or U.S. corporate bond spreads, and the Emerg-
ing Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI ).
Tradables experience strong inﬂationary pressures during crises as the
exchange rate depreciates. On other hand, the pass-through to nontrad-
ables is more limited. Thus, targeting a measure of inﬂation that over-
weights nontradables also will reduce the central bank’s incentive to raise
interest rates during crises.
Finally, since the central bank injects reserves too aggressively during
crises, we suggest that its objectives be modiﬁed to place weight on the
stock of reserve holdings. Choosing an appropriate weight for reserves will
help the central bank to internalize the eﬀect of its exchange interventions
on the private sector’s insurance incentives.
Our paper is most directly related to the literature on monetary policy
in economies with ﬁnancial frictions (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder 1988;
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Christiano, Gust, and Roldos forth-
coming; Diamond and Rajan 2001; Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci 2001;
Holmstrom and Tirole 1998; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2001; and Lorenzoni,
2001). Unlike most of this literature, we are concerned with monetary pol-
icy in emerging markets, so we model the presence of two distinct ﬁnancial
constraints: one between domestic agents and one between domestic
agents and foreign investors.1
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1. Of the preceding literature, the Diamond and Rajan paper (2001) is the closest to our
analysis in the sense that they also model two distinct constraints: a bank solvency constraint
and an aggregate liquidity constraint, in their case.The recent emerging-markets literature has identiﬁed sudden stops of in-
ternational capital ﬂows as an important part of external crises (see, for ex-
ample, Calvo 1998 and Calvo and Reinhart 2002). Our model shares this
feature. We model the sudden stop as a tightening of international ﬁnan-
cial constraints. The importance of international ﬁnancial constraints for
emerging markets was ﬁrst identiﬁed in the sovereign debt literature (see,
for example, Bulow and Rogoﬀ 1989).
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) oﬀer another perspective on fear of ﬂoating.
They argue that, since so much of debt in emerging markets is in dollars, a
central bank will recognize that the output cost of allowing the exchange
rate to depreciate during a crisis is too high, and will therefore raise inter-
est rates. In one sense, the mechanism in our model complements their ex-
planation. An open question in the Calvo and Reinhart model is why ﬁrms
take on so much dollar debt (i.e., Calvo and Reinhart take stocks of foreign
debt as exogenous). We show that stabilizing the exchange rate will reduce
the private sector’s incentive to insure against sudden stops, and naturally
leads to increasing liability dollarization (see Caballero and Krishna-
murthy 2003). On the other hand, our central bank stabilizes the exchange
rate because it focuses on inﬂation costs, as opposed to Calvo and Rein-
hart’s output costs. The emphasis on insurance is central to our analysis
and links us more closely to Dooley (2000), who also emphasizes insurance
eﬀects.
Our monetary policy analysis is conducted in a standard inﬂation-
targeting framework (e.g., King 1994; Svensson 1999; or Woodford 2002).
Svensson (2000) has extended the inﬂation-targeting framework to open
economies that ﬁt the usual small-open-economy assumption, in which
countries face no international ﬁnancial constraint. His analysis is most
applicable to countries such as Australia or Canada, but less so to the
emerging markets that are the focus of this paper.
The next two sections develop a model of monetary policy in an environ-
ment of sudden stops. Section 10.4 then studies optimal monetary policy
in this environment. Section 10.5 focuses on the central bank’s behavior
when it cannot commit to its monetary policy choices. Section 10.6 con-
siders two modiﬁcations to the central bank’s objectives that result in the
optimal monetary policy being implemented. Section 10.7 adds interna-
tional reserves to the model. Section 10.8 concludes.
10.2 A Model of Sudden Stops
In this section we sketch a model of sudden stops. This serves as a prelude
to the monetary policy analysis of the next section. The model we outline
is developed more rigorously in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002).
Firms have assets at time tof At. These are domestic assets (i.e., they gen-
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terest rate and At is a decreasing function.2
We assume that ﬁrms need dollars for investment. That is, they need dol-
lars in order to import some investment goods that are inputs to produc-
tion. This is justiﬁed by noting that at the margin, ﬁrms in developing coun-
tries are borrowers in international markets. We are extrapolating this
demand, so that ﬁrms always have to borrow from abroad.
Moreover, we assume that ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained so that the
aggregate demand for investment goods can be written as D(At, it
d). As in
most models of ﬁnancial constraints, the net worth of ﬁrms inﬂuences their
demand. Firms sell their peso assets, worth At, along with any other peso
funds they are able to borrow, in order to raise dollars for investment
goods. The dollars are borrowed at interest rate of it
d, which is the price in
the demand schedule. D is decreasing in it
d and increasing in At.
The supply of dollars comes from two sources. First, we assume that do-
mestic lenders have a supply of Rt dollars (small). The rest are capital in-
ﬂows, CF t. Thus, in equilibrium,
(1) D(At(it), it
d)   Rt   CF t.










where εt is the peso-dollar exchange rate. Supplying one dollar yields εt pe-
sos today. Invested at the peso interest rate of it and converting back into
dollars tomorrow at εt 1|t yields the above expression.
Supplying one dollar is proﬁtable as long as this return exceeds the in-
ternational interest rate (1   it ∗). Deﬁne
it








    1.
For it
d   it ∗ there is an excess return on supplying dollars to domestic ﬁrms.
The spread it
d – it ∗ is a liquidity premium.
The usual small-open-economy assumption is that the supply of dollars
is perfectly elastic at the price of it
d   it ∗. In this case, the equilibrium level
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2. In the next section we derive a more explicit sticky-price mechanism that justiﬁes using
the nominal interest rate as an argument. Note that if domestic liabilities are extensively dol-
larized, then At also becomes a decreasing function of the exchange rate. In this case, mone-
tary policy is less eﬀective in inﬂuencing the peso value of domestic assets since the expan-
sionary eﬀect of lowering it is oﬀset by the depreciation such policy causes. See Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2002) for a discussion of constrained monetary regimes in an environment
with sudden stops. On the other hand, dollarization of externalliabilities can be seen as an en-
dogenous response to the mechanism we discuss in this paper and is described in detail in Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy (2003).of investment is simply D(At, it ∗). Fixing the foreign interest rate, a fall in
the domestic net worth of ﬁrms (say, through an increase in it) decreases in-
vestment.
The sudden-stop assumption is that there are times when the country is
quantity constrained in borrowing from international markets. That is,
CF t   Lt,
where Lt is the maximum quantity of funds that foreign investors will
supply to this country. If this constraint binds, equilibrium is
(2) D(At, it
d)   Rt   Lt ⇒ it
d   it ∗
Note here that an increase in Athas no eﬀect on investment. This is because
investment is determined by the sudden-stop supply of Lt Rt. Instead the
only eﬀect of At is on it
d.
Deﬁning et as the log exchange rate, we can rewrite the domestic interest
parity condition as
(3) et 1|t   et   it   it
d.
When it
d   it ∗ this is the usual interest parity condition. In that case, ﬁxing
et 1|t, a decrease in the peso interest rate of it, depreciates the exchange rate.
In the sudden-stop case, where it
d   it ∗, the current exchange rate is depre-
ciated relative to the future exchange rate by the size of the liquidity pre-
mium. In this case, a decrease in it has the additional eﬀect of causing the
interest parity condition to shift upward, reinforcing the depreciation in
the exchange rate.
The model we have outlined embeds two principal ideas. First, there are
times when an emerging economy is ﬁnancially constrained in the interna-
tional market. In this instance, the supply of dollars is inelastic and the lim-
ited supply determines domestic investment and output. The second idea
is that the main eﬀect of monetary policy is on the domestic borrowing ca-
pacity of ﬁrms. In particular, decreasing interest rates during a sudden stop
does not attract more capital inﬂows. It has a potentially very large eﬀect
on the exchange rate but limited contemporaneous eﬀect on output. The
last part of this statement follows from the right-hand side of equation (2),
which is ﬁxed. The earlier part of the statement follows from the left-hand
side of the same expression and the fact that At rises as it falls. Thus id must
rise to ensure equilibrium; by the interest parity condition, this implies that
the exchange rate depreciates to oﬀset not only the reduction in it but also
the rise in it
d.
We denote the sudden-stop state as the V regime. In the V regime, Lt  
Rt fully determines investment. Let us imagine shifting to date t – 1, to a
point in time where private and central bank actions may inﬂuence this
stock.
Suppose that at date t – 1 the economy is not in a sudden stop. The supply
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t–1(Hregime). A domestic agent with some
dollars at this date can either lend these funds for domestic investment or
can save them in an international bond. By opting to save, the agent will be
able to lend the dollar at t and earn an excess return of it
d – it ∗. That is, the
fact that it
d   it ∗ will induce domestic agents to “insure” against the sudden
stop (raising Rt).
We  have shown elsewhere (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001)
that when domestic ﬁnancial markets are underdeveloped, there is an
externality—akin to a free-rider problem—whereby the market value of
this beneﬁt, it
d – it∗, is less than its social value. In this circumstance, the
private sector will underinsure against sudden stops. This underinsurance
may take many forms: for example, borrowing too much, contracting for-
eign currency–denominated debt, choosing short-term debt maturities,
or contracting too few credit lines (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy
2003).
Aside from direct (and costly) regulation of capital inﬂows and the pri-
vate sector’s insurance decisions, there are two instruments at the central
bank’s disposal to oﬀset the externality. First, it can increase its own hold-
ing of foreign reserves and thereby increase Rt. Our model provides a nat-
ural motivation for both centralized holding of reserves and holding them
in the form of international liquidity. We will return to this mechanism be-
fore concluding the paper. Second, and most important for the purpose of
this paper, the central bank can commit to expandingmonetary policy dur-
ing the sudden stop. Since lowering it during the sudden stop raises it
d, this
increases the private sector’s incentive to self-insure. We develop this idea
fully in the next sections.
10.3 Sudden Stops and Monetary Policy
We now extend the preceding model to incorporate monetary policy and
private-sector price setting. Our goal is to study optimal monetary policy
in an environment of sudden stops.
At date t – 1, we assume that the economy is in the H regime. That is, the
external supply of funds it faces is elastic at the interest rate of i∗. At date
t, the economy either remains in the H regime or transits to the V regime.
The probability of remaining in H is q, while that of entering V is 1 – q. Fi-
nally, at date t   1, the crisis episode passes, and the economy is in the H
regime. We denote the nominal exchange rate at date t   1 as e  , and ﬁx this
to be independent of all events at the prior dates. At prior dates, the ex-
change rates are et and et–1.
We are mainly interested in what happens at date t. At this date, aggre-
gate demand is given by
(4) y ˜t
d    b(rt   i∗),
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d is the output gap and i∗ is the constant foreign interest rate (only
a normalization in this equation). Foreign inﬂation is equal to zero.
The domestic real interest rate, rt, is deﬁned by
(5) rt   it    t 1|t
where itis the (peso) nominal interest rate and  t 1|tis the expectation of in-
ﬂation between periods t and t   1, conditional on information at date t.
On the supply side, we assume that the economy is composed of two
types of price setters. Slow price setters set their prices to grow at a constant
rate of    over both periods (i.e., from t – 1 to t and from t to t   1). They
choose this average growth rate to be equal to the expected rate of depreci-
ation of the exchange rate:
(6)      Et 1   
et  
2
et 1       
et 1
2
  et    .
Fast price setters index their prices to the exchange rate. Putting these two
groups together and assigning positive weights of   and 1 –   to the slow
and fast price setters, respectively, yields an inﬂation rate between t and 
t   1 of
      (1    )(et 1   et).
The expected change in the exchange rate between any two dates satis-
ﬁes the domestic interest parity condition we derived in equation (3),
(7) et 1|t   et   it   it
d.
Substituting the interest parity condition into the inﬂation expression
yields
(8)  t 1    t 1|t         (1    )(it   it
d).
We now rewrite the aggregate-demand equation to account for the in-
ﬂation term we have derived in equation (8). First note that
rt   i∗    (it   it
d     )   (it
d   i∗).
Substituting this into the aggregate-demand expression yields
(9) y ˜t
d    b( ı ˜t   ı ˜t
d),
where
ı ˜t   it   it
d     , ı ˜t
d   it
d   i∗.
The aggregate-demand equation, (9), is a simple parameterization of the
aggregate demand in the prior section, equation (1). Note that it is de-
creasing in both the domestic (peso) real interest rate and the domestic in-
terest rate on dollar borrowing.
430 Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind KrishnamurthyEquilibrium and policy determine the domestic dollar (it
d) and peso (it)
rates. Beginning with the former, in the H regime domestic dollar rates
must be equal to international interest rates because the supply of dollars
is perfectly elastic at it ∗. Thus:
ı ˜t
d,H   0.
In the V regime, the sudden stop implies that id,V   i∗ (see equation [2]).
We impose the sudden-stop constraint directly as a constraint on output:
y ˜t
V    ay   adı ˜d,V
t|t 1 ay   0.
The ﬁrst term indicates that output falls below the natural level. The sec-
ond term reﬂects the private sector’s incentives to insure against the sudden
stop. If the private sector anticipates a high value of ı˜t
d,V during the sudden
stop, it will be inclined to take precautionary steps. We argued earlier that
in emerging markets the private value of precautioning is typically too
small relative to its social value (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2002 for
a model showing this). Thus, in our monetary policy analysis we are con-
cerned with ways in which the central bank can increase the incentive to
take precautions.
Finally, we consider the average depreciation of the exchange rate over
both periods in order to derive an expression for the    set by the slow price
setters. First note that
et 1|t   et   it   it
d   ı ˜t
      .
Next, from the interest parity condition at date t – 1,
et|t 1   et 1   it 1   i∗.
We need to make an assumption about the central bank’s behavior at date
t – 1. We make the simplest one, and assume that it sets the real domestic
interest rate equal to the international interest rate (recall that foreign in-
ﬂation is normalized to zero): it–1 –      i∗. Note that this policy choice is
consistent with attaining a zero output gap if the aggregate-demand rela-
tion in equation (9) also applied at date t– 1.
Substituting the exchange rates back into the expression for     from
equation (6) gives
      
   
2




]       ,
which implies that
(11) E[ı ˜t
 ]   0.
Relation (11) is central to what follows. The rate ı˜  is the deviation be-
tween the average domestic real interest rate (it
  –    ) and the liquidity-
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d, ). Constraint (11) arises from ra-
tional-expectations price setting by the private sector. It tells us that if the
central bank chooses a low real interest rate in one of the states, in equilib-
rium, the real interest rate in the other state must be high.
We can rewrite the expression for  t 1 more concisely using the tilde no-
tation as
(12)  t 1       (1    )ı ˜t
 .
By symmetry with inﬂation at t 1, the inﬂation rate between date t– 1 and
date t is
 t         (1    )(et   et 1).
Since et   e  – (ı˜      ) (from interest parity condition and the assumption
et 1   e  ) and e  – et–1   2    (see the deﬁnition of    ), we ﬁnd that
(13)  t       (1    )ı ˜t
 
10.4 Optimal Policy
Maximizing social welfare for this economy is achieved by minimizing
the expected value, given information at t – 1, of the loss function, L:
(14) L    y ˜t
2    t
2   (1    ) 2
t 1,
where 0    1 is a discount rate.
These terms are fairly standard in the inﬂation-targeting literature. The
ﬁrst term is the cost of output ﬂuctuations around potential output, while
the other terms reﬂect the cost of inﬂation. The parameter  determines the
relative weight on output gap stabilization.
We now derive the optimal monetary policy when the central bank can
commit to its choices of (ı˜t
H, ı˜t
V ) in advance.




H    b ı ˜t
H.
In V, we solve for the equilibrium ı˜t
d,V. Analogous to equation (2), in the
V regime, ı˜t
d,V must be such that yt from equation (9) is consistent with yt
V
from the external ﬁnancial constraint (10). That is,
 bı ˜t
d,V   b ı ˜t
V    ay   adı ˜d,V
t|t 1.
Since ı˜t
d,V   ı˜d,V
t|t–1 under rational expectations, we see that the relation be-
tween ı˜t
d,V and ı˜t
V for anticipated changes in the latter is
(15) ı ˜t
d,V    (ay   b ı ˜t
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d,V. Since ı˜t
d,V
is decreasing in ı˜t
V, this means that lowering ı˜t
V has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on
output in V. The eﬀect is through an “insurance” channel. By anticipating
a lower ı˜t
V during the sudden stop, the expectation of ı˜t
d,V rises. That is, the
return to insuring against the sudden stop increases, and this relaxes the
aggregate ﬁnancial constraint. On the other hand, the usual aggregate-
demand eﬀect of lowering interest rates—the contemporaneous eﬀect of ı˜t
V
on y—is absent in the V regime. Ex post, since y ˜t
V is ﬁxed at date t, the pos-
itive eﬀect on aggregate demand of a reduction in ı˜t
V is fully oﬀset by the
negative eﬀect of the corresponding rise in ı˜t
d,V.
When state-contingent monetary policy is fully anticipated, output in
V is
y ˜t
V      b(ay    adı ˜t
V).
We assume throughout that y ˜t
V   0, so that increasing y ˜t
V lowers the objec-
tive in equation (14).3




V,   )
qLH   (1   q)LV,
where
LV    (b )2(ay    adı ˜t
V)2   [     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2   (1    )[     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2
and
LH    (b ı ˜t
H)2   [     (1    )ı ˜t
H]2   (1    )[     (1    )ı ˜t
H]2
subject to the rational expectations constraint that
E[ı ˜t
 ]   0.






   
    2(1   q)[     (1    )ı ˜t
V   2(1    )(1   q)[     (1    )ı ˜t
V] 
  2q[     (1    )ı ˜t
H]   2(1    )q[     (1    )ı ˜t
H] 
  2     2(1    )E[ı ˜t
 ]   2(1    ){     (1    )E[ı ˜t
 ]} 
  2(2    )     0 ⇒    
c   0,
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     ı˜t
V. 
Although ı˜t
V is an endogenous variable, it is possible to show that the assumption can al-
ways be met by choosing ay large enough.where the superscript c stands for the commitment solution. Thus, in the
full commitment case, the central bank chooses policy so as to achieve a
zero average rate of inﬂation. Since all price setters take into account aver-
age inﬂation, there is no beneﬁt, only costs, for the central bank to choose
a positive average inﬂation.
This does not mean that monetary policy is impotent. If we compute the
marginal beneﬁt of increasing ı˜t











     0   2(1   q)  aday(b )2   0,
which implies that the central bank will choose ı˜t
V   0 (since we are mini-
mizing the objective).
The exact solution is
(16) ı ˜t
V    ay .
The central bank sets it
Vbelow it
d,Vin order to increase the private sector’s
incentives to insure against the sudden stop. The cost of this policy is that
the exchange rate depreciates in the V regime. To oﬀset the eﬀect of this
policy on average inﬂation, the central bank chooses ı˜t
H   0 (see equation
[11]), so that policy is tighter in the H regime and output is lower.
Note that as a result of its attempt to increase precautioning against the
V regime and hence increase y ˜V, the central bank tolerates some instability
in inﬂation and exchange rates.
10.5 The Central Bank Without Commitment
Let us now study a central bank that cannot commit to the interest rate
choices of date t, prior to this date. Two biases arise from the lack of com-
mitment. First, if the central bank’s preferences are as stated in equation
(14) it will choose interest rates to completely stabilize the exchange rate
(“fear of ﬂoating”). Second, if the central bank’s preferences are distorted
so as to always prefer to increase output, as in Barro and Gordon (1983),
then the fear-of-ﬂoating problem is made worse. The central bank loosens
in the H state and tightens in the V state, while inducing a positive average
rate of inﬂation. This is exactly the opposite of the policy dictated in the
commitment solution.
10.5.1 Fear of Floating
Suppose that the central bank chooses interest rates in each state (H or V )
to minimize the loss function in equation (14). Then in H it solves
min
ı ˜t
H LH    (b ı ˜t
H)2   [     (1    )ı ˜t
H]2   (1    )[     (1    )ı ˜t
H]2
q  ad(b )2
     
 (b )2[q( ad)2   1   q]   (2    )(1    )2
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min
ı ˜t
V LV   [     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2   (1    )[     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2.
Compared to the loss function in V of the previous section, the main
change is that there is no output term. This follows from our assumption in
equation (10) that there is no aggregate demand channel whereby lowering
interest rates increases output. The loss function in H is the same as in the
previous section.
It is easy to verify that the solution to these two problems (that is con-
sistent with the rational-expectations requirement that E[ı˜t
 ]   0 is to set
ı˜t
H   ı˜t
V   0, with      0. Note that at      0, inﬂation and the exchange rate
are fully stabilized by choosing ı˜t
H   ı˜t
V   0, with      0. In addition, the
output gap in H is equal to zero.
While the policy stabilizes both inﬂation and the exchange rate, the cost
is that output drops too much in the sudden-stop state, V. The central bank
essentially ignores the insurance channel of monetary policy and focuses
purely on maintaining a stable exchange rate.
10.5.2 Exacerbating the Problem: Barro-Gordon
We now modify the central bank’s objective function to introduce an ex-
pansionary bias a la Barro and Gordon (1983):
(17) L      y ˜t    t
2   (1    ) 2
t 1.
The y ˜t term now reﬂects the central bank’s preference to always raise out-
put. We drop the squared-output term since it does not change our message.
The choice problem in H is
min
ı ˜t
H LH    b ı ˜t
H   [     (1    )ı ˜t
H]2   (1    )[     (1    )ı ˜t
H]2.
This gives the ﬁrst-order condition
(18) ı ˜t















Note that a larger value of   (greater preference for increasing output)
leads to a lower interest rate choice. A higher value of     oﬀsets this ten-
dency.
The choice problem in V remains the same as in the fear-of-ﬂoating case
since output, as of date t, is ﬁxed:
min
ı ˜t
V LV   [     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2   (1    )[     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2.
The ﬁrst-order condition is
(19) ı ˜t
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 ]   0, it follows from equa-
tions (18) and (19) that






    0.
Replacing this expression back into equations (18) and (19), we ﬁnd that 
ı˜t
H   0 and ı˜t
V   0:
ı ˜t






    0,
ı ˜t






    0.
The central-bank preference for increasing output has a perverse eﬀect
in our model. Since lowering interest rates in H increases output, the cen-
tral bank sets ı˜H   0. As in Barro-Gordon, the anticipation of the low in-
terest rate in H raises the private sector’s inﬂation expectations and leads
to      0. In V, the central bank sees no output beneﬁt to changing interest
rates since output is predetermined by the sudden-stop supply. However,
since the average rate of inﬂation is now positive, the central bank is faced
with an exchange rate that depreciates at date t. To counter this, the central
bank raises the interest rate in V. In equilibrium, this leads to a lower ı˜t
d,V
and an even tighter sudden-stop supply. The crisis is thereby exacerbated.
10.6 Implementing Optimal Policy through Inﬂation Targets
Given the time inconsistency of the central bank, what should its mandate
be? That is, how should the central bank’s objectives be modiﬁed so that it
internalizes the insurance dimension of the sudden-stop problem? In this
section we highlight two possibilities. First, inﬂation targets can be made
state dependent: stringent (low) in Hand loose (high) in V. Second, the cen-
tral bank’s mandate can overweight the inﬂation of nontradables in the
measure of inﬂation that it targets. Since output contracts in the V regime,
there is deﬂation in nontradables. The inﬂation-targeting central bank
oﬀsets this by lowering interest rates and causing the exchange rate to de-
preciate (leading to inﬂation in tradables). This incentive increases by plac-
ing a larger weight on nontradables.
10.6.1 State-Contingent Inﬂation Targets
We continue with the linear-output speciﬁcation but modify the central
bank’s objective function to introduce a state-contingent inﬂation penalty
term of   , for     {H, V}:
(20) L      y ˜t   ( t     )2   (1    )( t 1     )2.
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negative   penalizes inﬂation further.
The choice problem in H is
min
ı ˜t
H LH    b ı ˜t
H   [      H   (1    )ı ˜t
H]2   (1    )[      H   (1    )ı ˜t
H]2.
This gives the ﬁrst-order condition
ı ˜t















Note that, everything else being constant, a larger value of  H leads to a
lower interest rate in H.
The choice problem in V is
min
ı ˜t
V LV   [      V   (1    )ı ˜t
V]2   (1    )[      V   (1    )ı ˜t
V]2.
The ﬁrst order condition is now
ı ˜t













As before, since in equilibrium we must have that E[ı˜t
 ]   0, we obtain






    (1   q) V   q H.
We note that in the commitment solution    is equal to zero. Imposing
     0 yields a constraint across   :











If there is a strong Barro-Gordon inﬂation bias (high  ), then  H can be
made low in order to oﬀset this bias. Similarly, to the extent that the cen-
tral bank has a loose inﬂation target in V (if  V is high),  H can be set low
so the net result is a    of zero.
Substituting this  expression back into the ﬁrst-order conditions for in-
terest rate choices allows us to solve for the optimal interest rate choices
ı ˜t
























By choosing  V 0 (and hence  H 0), the central bank will follow a state-
contingent policy as dictated in the social optimum, with ı˜t
H 0 and ı˜t
V 0.
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d,V and a looser sudden-stop supply.
The crisis is thereby lessened.
Before we conclude this section, note that both the state-contingent in-
ﬂation target and the nontradable-inﬂation overweight solutions act
through the inﬂation terms of the central-bank objective. If we were to in-
troduce a contemporaneous output eﬀect of a change in ı˜V, these recom-
mendations would remain, but there would be an additional channel open:
we could now also achieve the desirable eﬀect by raising the weight of out-
put in the central bank’s objective during V regimes.
10.6.2 Nontradable Inﬂation Target
Let us now introduce an inﬁnitesimal (in the sense that it does not feed
back into aggregate demand) nontradable good, whose inﬂation is deter-
mined by a simple Phillips curve:
 t
N       y ˜t.
We modify the measure of inﬂation that the central bank targets to be a
weighted average of  t
N and the tradable inﬂation of  t that we have been
using so far. The central bank’s objective function is
(21) L      y ˜t   [  t
N   (1    ) t     ]2
  (1    )[  N
t 1   (1    ) t 1     ]2.
  is the weight on nontradable inﬂation. We normalize the t   1 (noncri-
sis) inﬂation rate on nontradables to be zero. Finally we set  V   0 (leaving
 H   0).
The choice problem in V is
min
ı ˜t
V LV   [      y ˜t
V   (1    )(1    )ı ˜t
V]2
  (1    )(1    )2[     (1    )ı ˜t
V]2
The ﬁrst-order condition is
ı ˜t
V   .
The choice problem in H is
min
ı ˜t
H LH    b ı ˜t
H   [      H    b ı ˜t
H   (1    )ı ˜t
H]2










This gives a solution for ı˜t
H that is linearly increasing in    , decreasing in  ,
and decreasing in  H.
   [1   (1    )(1    )]    y ˜t
V
    
(1    )(1    )(2    )
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is, when we impose the equilibrium condition that E[ı˜t
 ]   0, we arrive at a
relation for    in terms of  H. We simply choose  H so that    equals zero.
Given this  H, ı˜t
V is proportional to  y ˜t
V. Since y ˜t
V   0, we can implement
ı˜t
V   0 by choosing   0. Since E[ı˜t
 ]   0, this means that ı˜t
H   0, which is
achieved by setting  H   0.
By increasing the weight on nontradables in the measure of inﬂation that
the central bank targets, the central bank follows a state-contingent policy
as dictated in the social optimum. Again, in equilibrium, this leads to a
higher ı˜t
d,V and a looser sudden-stop supply.
10.7 Reserves Management
Since crises are characterized by dollar shortages (see equation [2]),
there is scope in the model for managing international reserves in order to
ease these shortages. Our model provides a natural motivation both for
centralized holding of reserves and for holding them in the form of dollars.
We assume that the central bank has a small amount of international re-
serves at date t. These reserves can be injected at date t or saved for use be-
yond date t   1, when they yield   0 utils per unit of reserves. The latter
represents the opportunity cost of using the reserves early, and should be
interpreted more broadly as the value of precautioning.
We contrast how the results of section 10.4 and section 10.5.1 change
upon the introduction of international reserves. The loss function in both
cases is modiﬁed to
(22) L    y ˜t
2    t
2   (1    ) 2
t 1    Rt,
with Rt the amount of reserves injected.
Recall that in section 10.4 we solve for the interest rate choices that the
central bank commits to in minimizing the loss function, while in section
10.5.1 we solve for the sequentially optimal interest rate choices given this
loss function.
There is no value in injecting reserves in H. Since there is no dollar short-
age, the action has no eﬀect on either prices or output. Reserves will be
hoarded because failing to do so has an opportunity cost  . In the V re-
gime, the action increases dollar supply and relaxes the vertical constraint
(10) to
(23) y ˜t
V   Rt
V   ay   adı ˜d,V
t|t 1.
One can see from this expression that Rt
V enters exactly as –ay in all the ex-
pressions. In particular,
(24) y ˜t
V    b(Rt
V   ay    adı ˜t
V).
Inﬂation Targeting and Sudden Stops 439As we discussed earlier, the optimal policy considers the dependence of y ˜t
V
on ı˜t
d,V(which enters through expectations), while the no-commitment case
does not.
The introduction of international reserves-management considerations
does not change any of the main qualitative conclusions with respect to
monetary policy in either the commitment or no-commitment case of sec-
tions 10.4 and 10.5.1, respectively. In particular, it is still the case that     
0 in both cases, that ı˜H   ı˜V   0 in the no-commitment case, and that ı˜H  
0 and ı˜V   0 in the commitment case.4
However, reserve injections are a substitute for (countercyclical) mone-
tary policy. To see this, note that in the commitment solution for ı˜t
Vin equa-
tion (16), ı˜t
Vis decreasing in ay. Since Rt
Venters as –ayin all expressions, the
reserve injection increases the optimal ı˜t
V.
The most interesting new result comes from the ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to Rt




V,c    
2 (b
 
 )2     ay    adı ˜t
V.
From equations (22) and (23), the solution for Rt
V in the no-commitment
case is
(26) Rt




    ay    adı ˜t
V
Note that b  b/(b ad)  1, so the ﬁrst term is more negative in the com-
mitment case. Also, since for any equilibrium level of Rt
V, ı˜t
V,c   ı˜t
V,nc, we
have that Rt
V,nc   Rt
V,c. That is, the central bank with no commitment not
only will use too little monetary policy but also will inject reserves too ag-
gressively.
There are two factors behind this result. First, injecting reserves both in-
creases output and decreases ı ˜t
d,V. Ex post, the central bank considers the
output beneﬁt, but ignores the eﬀect on ı ˜t
d,V. Ex ante, the central bank ac-
counts for the second eﬀect: the lower ı ˜t
d,V decreases the private sector’s in-
centives to insure against the sudden-stop shock. The latter eﬀect makes the
commitment central bank inject less reserves than the no-commitment one.
The second factor has to do with the time inconsistency of monetary
policy. In the no-commitment solution, the central bank has to oﬀset a
larger crisis caused by the inadequate monetary policy. As a result, it over-
injects its reserves.
The latter factor is remedied indirectly by solving the monetary policy
time-inconsistency problem as we have discussed. The former factor, on the
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4. These statements assume that Rt   ay, so that there is insuﬃcient international reserves
to eliminate the sudden-stop shock.other hand, requires further modiﬁcation to the central bank’s mandate so
that it increases the value it assigns to hoarding reserves during the Vregime.
10.8 Final Remarks
We have analyzed monetary policy in an environment of sudden stops.
Sudden stops are times when a country is ﬁnancially constrained in the in-
ternational ﬁnancial market. In this context, lowering or raising domestic
interest rates has only small eﬀects on the tightness of this ﬁnancial con-
straint, but such action does have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the domestic bor-
rowing capacity of agents. Moreover, the anticipation of such actions is
important in determining precautionary actions that agents take against
sudden stops.
From this viewpoint, we have derived positive and normative results for
monetary policy and reserves management. We have highlighted a new
time-inconsistency problem and its interaction with the conventional sta-
bilization bias. Finally, we have suggested how an inﬂation-targeting frame-
work can restore incentives, so that central banks behave optimally.
Our model is clearly very stylized. In particular, our assumption that the
country faces a vertical supply of funds during sudden stops is extreme.
But it is important to realize that our main conclusions do not depend on
this extreme. We could consider a more general model in which the supply
of funds was not completely inelastic in the V regime. In this case, the V
regime would have both an aggregate-demand channel and the insurance
channel we have highlighted (i.e., lowering ı˜t
V leads to a contemporaneous
increase in y ˜t
V). Importantly, relative to the H regime, the output-inﬂation
trade-oﬀ will still turn steeper (although not vertical) during the V regime,
and hence the central bank will be prone to favor inﬂation over output tar-
gets more than in the H regime. Moreover, as long as the insurance chan-
nel is present, this reaction will remain suboptimal.
Insurance against sudden stops aﬀects many policy decisions in emerg-
ing markets, from reserve management to liquidity ratio requirements. It
seems only natural that optimal monetary policy be analyzed in the same
light, as in this paper. Moreover, it is important to understand the interac-
tion of monetary policy with other insurance policies (as we have with re-
serve policies). We hope that our framework provides a starting point for
such an integrated approach.
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Comment Ben S. Bernanke
This very interesting paper highlights the potential interaction in emerg-
ing-market economies between the monetary policy regime and the eﬀects
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nomics and Public affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Board of Governors
of the U.S. Federal Reserve System.of adverse shifts in the portfolio preferences of international investors
(“sudden stops”). It raises the possibility that inﬂation targeting may serve
as a form of commitment device for monetary authorities in those econ-
omies—not as a mechanism for committing to price stability per se, as is
usually the case in the inﬂation-targeting literature, but rather as a means
to commit to responding in a particular way to the sudden stop in capital
inﬂows. Speciﬁcally, the authors argue, adopting inﬂation targeting can be
viewed as a commitment not to defend the exchange rate in a crisis. If that
commitment is credible, then the ex ante incentive of domestic agents 
to be long in dollars (by forgoing dollar-denominated liabilities as well as
holding dollar assets) is increased, mitigating the severity of the dollar
shortage caused by the crisis. In short, the authors argue that adopting inﬂa-
tion targeting before the crisis may be an antidote to the “fear of ﬂoating”
problem stressed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
The model used to illustrate this point is highly stylized, which is both
a strength and a weakness—a strength, because it makes the basic eco-
nomic idea extremely clear; a weakness, because it thereby ignores some
complicating aspects of the problem that are likely to be crucial in real
economies. One particularly important omission is any consideration of
what caused the sudden stop in the ﬁrst place. (The paper assumes that
sudden stops are exogenous, but as ever-more-discriminating interna-
tional capital markets make episodes of pure contagion less likely, that as-
sumption does not seem particularly attractive.) If the source of the cri-
sis is, say, ongoing ﬁscal instability, then an inﬂation-targeting regime
may well be infeasible, for reasons of ﬁscal dominance. Another source
of crisis discussed in the literature is the combination of a poorly super-
vised banking system and a government that is unable to commit to not
bailing out the banking system if it fails (a moral hazard problem). In
such a situation a general bank run can provoke a ﬁscal crisis and hence
a sudden stop. Monetary policy would have little power to ameliorate this
type of crisis, however, because banks in particular would have no incen-
tive to be long in dollars, knowing that they will be bailed out in any case.
The correct response to this type of problem is some combination of bank
supervision (e.g., limiting exposure to dollar liabilities) and ﬁscal com-
mitment devices to moderate the government’s moral hazard. The gen-
eral point is that whatever factors create the potential for sudden stops
will also likely aﬀect the feasibility and desirability of the solution pro-
posed here.
Another drawback of the stylized nature of the model is that its empir-
ical plausibility is diﬃcult to assess. For example, an implication of the
model is that when the central bank defends the exchange rate (the time-
consistent solution), we should see deﬂation in nontradables. (This result
provides the basis for equating inﬂation targeting in nontradables prices to
a commitment to devaluation.) Because in practice nontradables prices
cannot be insulated from the exchange rate (a depreciation aﬀects wage de-
Inﬂation Targeting and Sudden Stops 443mands, the costs of inputs, and inﬂation expectations), I would guess that
a sudden stop would typically lead to inﬂation in nontradables as well as
tradables. Some analysis of the data is called for. If a crisis does typically
lead to inﬂation in nontradables, and if, moreover, the nontradables inﬂa-
tion rate in a crisis is diﬃcult to forecast, then setting a quantitative inﬂa-
tion target in advance for nontradables, as recommended by the authors,
may not be particularly useful. Another empirical issue relates to the abil-
ity of the central bank to hit an inﬂation target in the time frame relevant
to an international ﬁnancial crisis; generally we believe that central banks
can control inﬂation only with a lag of months, not days or weeks. In short,
determining the practical relevance of the policy recommendation of this
paper will require a good deal more empirical analysis and quantiﬁcation.
My remaining comments concern some issues relating to the micro-
foundations of the model. First, the authors appeal to models of credit-
market imperfections in which collateral is used to mitigate agency costs.
It seems to me that the collateral that would be relevant for borrowing from
abroad would be denominated in dollars, not in pesos; but the authors as-
sume that the assets relevant to the domestic demand for investment goods,
At, are peso assets rather than dollar assets. This assumption would seem
to be of some consequence for the analysis, since only if these assets are in
pesos is the value of domestic collateral aﬀected by devaluation. A related
point concerns the ex ante holdings of dollar assets by domestic investors,
which confers a social beneﬁt (being a form of insurance) in this model. But
dollar holdings by domestics may also be viewed as a form of capital ﬂight;
and in a world of capital-market imperfections, in which domestics are pre-
sumed to have superior local information, the fact that domestics are not
investing in the home market should involve deadweight losses, which are
ignored here.
Second, I also had some concerns about the pricing assumptions in the
model. The authors distinguish two types of producers of domestic goods:
“fast” pricers, who tie their prices to the exchange rate, and “slow” pricers,
who set their prices in advance according to their expectation of the ex-
change rate. I understand the reasons for these assumptions, but I wonder
if they are entirely sensible economically. First, domestic goods and im-
ported investment goods are not perfect substitutes, so it is not evident that
pricing should be such as to keep the expected real exchange rate constant.
Second, because the actual exchange rate may diﬀer radically from the ex-
pected exchange rate in a crisis, it seems unreasonable to assume that even
very “slow” pricers do not reset their prices when a crisis occurs. Allowing
repricing in a crisis would certainly aﬀect some of the results of the model.
To reiterate my main impressions, I found the paper stimulating and use-
ful. More quantitative analysis is needed to translate this stylized model
into concrete recommendations for policy. But at a more qualitative level,
the paper oﬀers another compelling argument for why emerging-market
444 Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthycountries should abandon exchange rate pegs, which have not served them
well in recent years, in favor of inﬂation targeting or other monetary poli-
cies that focus on domestic macroeconomic stability.
Discussion Summary
Jose De Gregorio suggested that the conclusions depended importantly
upon the assumption of a model in which there is no eﬀect of exchange
rates on output. He proposed that the result might be quite diﬀerent if, for
example, an expenditure-switching eﬀect were allowed for.
Mark Gertler pointed out that the main reason for the limited interest
rate eﬀects in the model was the segmentation between the markets for do-
mestic and foreign currency funds—that is, the absence of arbitrage be-
tween these two markets.
Michael Bordo argued that ﬁnancial development and a measure of ﬁs-
cal stability were necessary preconditions for the successful adoption of a
nominal anchor in emerging economies.
In response to Bernanke’s comments, Ricardo Caballeropointed out that
a major reason for fear of ﬂoating was the need to maintain control of in-
ﬂation expectations. He stressed that the paper did not aim to explain par-
ticular historical episodes, but to provide a framework to think about in-
ﬂation targeting in the presence of capital ﬂow volatility. Credible
inﬂation-targeting regimes are new to emerging-market economics. He em-
phasized that the distribution of inﬂation between tradable and nontrad-
able goods depended on the response of inﬂation expectations to a devalu-
ation; during currency crises the pass-through from nominal exchange rates
to domestic prices could be very diﬀerent from that of other periods. Re-
garding the importance of the domestic interest rate even when most of the
borrowing occurred in foreign currency, he pointed out that during market
segmentation episodes monetary policy aﬀected the domestic dollar rate.
When used correctly, monetary policy alleviated the ineﬃciency due to
market segmentation by reallocating external resources from times of high
foreign capital inﬂows to times of low capital inﬂows. The more general
underlying theme was the sudden segmentation of markets during ﬁnancial
crises, which was most extreme during collapses of the banking sector. Be-
cause a sudden stop could be interpreted as a crash in the value of an asset—
namely, the value of the country’s collateral—the paper was more broadly
applicable to the question of how monetary policy should respond to asset
market crises. The particular challenge posed by this model was the risk that
monetary policy might be losing its eﬀectiveness during the crisis, and this
risk carried implications for the conduct of policy prior to a crisis.
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